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Introdu ction

S

ince 1990 the UN Security Council has adopted a number of resolutions calling on UN members to take various kinds of action that have the potential,
depending on how those resolutions are interpreted, to interfere with States' navigational rights under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982
LOS Convention).l These resolutions, virtually all of which were explicitly adopted
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, fall into a nwnber of different categories.
A firs t category is resolutions providing for the enforcement of sanctions imposed under Article 41 of the Charter. They include Resolution 221 (I 966)2 (paragraph 5 of which calls on the British government " to prevent, by the use afforce if
necessary, the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying o il destined for Southern Rhodesia"); Resolution 665 (1990)' (paragraph 1 of which calls
on those UN Member States deploying m aritime forces in the Persian Gulf to " use
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such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary
under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping, in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to
ensure strict implementation" of the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq); Resolutions 787 (1992)4 (paragraph 12 of which contains similar provisions in respect
to the former Yugoslavia) and 820 (1993)5 (paragraphs 28 and 29 of which "prohibit all commercial maritime traffic from entering the territorial sea" of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and authorize States to "use such measures
commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority
of the Security Council to enforce" this prohibition); Resolutions 875 ( 1993)6 and
917 (1994)1 (of which paragraphs 1 and 10, respectively, contain provisions in respect
to Haiti similar to those in Resolutions 665 and 787); and Resolution 1132 (1997)8
(paragraph 8 of which contains similar provisions as regards Sierra Leone).9
A second category of Security Council resolutions that have the potential to interfere with States' navigational rights relates to the prevention of trafficking in
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) . Such resolutions include Resolution 1540
(2004)10 (paragraphs 3( c) and 10 of which call on all States to develop effective border controls to prevent illicit trafficking in WMD and to take cooperative action to
prevent such trafficking "consistent with international law") and Resolution 1718
(2006)11 (in paragraph 8(t) of which the Security Council "decides" that in orderto
prevent trafficking in WMD with North Korea, all UN Member States should take,
"consistent with international law, cooperative action including through inspection of cargo to and from" North Korea).
A third, and related, category concerns resolutions to prevent the transfer of certain materials to particular States. Examples include Resolution 1695 (2006)12
(paragraph 3 of which "requires all Member States . .. consistent with international
law to ... prevent missile and missile-related items, materials, goods and technology from being transferred" to North Korea) and Resolution 1696 (2006)13 (paragraph 5 of which contains similar provisions in respect to Iran ). Unlike the
resolutions in the first category, the resolutions in the second and third categories
do not explicitly refer to action being taken against shipping at sea. Nevertheless
their wording seems broad enough to encompass such action, although in the case
of Resolution 1540 its drafting history suggests otherwise. 14
A fourth category of Security Council resolutions that have the potential to interfere with 1982 LOS Convention navigational rights relates to the prevention of
terrorism. The main example of such resolutions is Resolution 1373 (2001),15 paragraph 2(b) of which "decides" that all States shall "take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts." There seems to be no reason why such steps
could not include action against ships while at sea.
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Last and certainly very far fro m least is the well-known set of Security Council
resolutions authorizing States to "use all necessary means" (in other words, force)
to achieve a particular goal, including Resolutions 678 (1990)16 (relating to Iraq),
794 (1992)17 (Somalia), 940 ( 1994)18 (Haiti) and 1264 (1999)19 (East Timor).
There seems no reason why "necessary means" could not cover the use offorce di·
rected at ships at sea in addition to the use offorce on land and in the air, which are
both clearly covered.
This article will attempt to answer three questions arising from the above resolutions and from possible future Security Council resolutions that could interfere
with navigational rights enshrined in the 1982 LOS Convention:
1. Is there in fac t, or is it likely that there could be, a conflict between such
UN Security Council resolutions, however interpreted, and provisions of
the 1982 LOS Convention concerned with navigational rights?
2. If so, are such conflicts resolved by either the UN Charter or the
Convention?
3. Would a dispute settlement body acting under Part XV of the
Convention have the competence to consider and rule on the above two
questions, as well as the competence to interpret relevant UN Security
Council resolutions? Given the breadth and generality of some of the
provisions of the resolutions quoted above, it may be essential for a 1982
LOS Convention dispute settlement body to interpret these provisions if
it is going to be able to answer questions 1 and 2.2(J
Before answering these three questions, it is necessary to establish the legal nature of UN Security Council resolutions, in particular whether they are legally
binding. Article 25 of the UN Charter provides that UN members "agree to accept
and carry out the decisions of the Security Council." It is clear, therefore, that "decisions" of the Security Council are binding on UN members. A contrario, any act
adopted by the Security Council that is not a "decision" is not legally binding. This
raises the question as to what acts adopted by the Security Council constitute "decisions" within the meaning of Article 25. The answer to this question depends primarily on the Charter provision under which an act is adopted and on its
wording. 21 Measures adopted under Chapter VI, other than decisions to carry out
an investigation under Article 34, are not "decisions" within the meaning of Article
25 .22 On the other hand, measures adopted by the Security Council under Chapter
VII are "decisions" if it is clear from their wording that they are intended to be legally binding. n If the language used by the Council is to "decide" that something is
to be done, that is d early intended to be legally binding and is thus a "decision"
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within the meaning of Article 25 . The same is true if the Council "requires" or "demands" that States do something. On the other hand, if the Council "encourages"
or "invites" States to do something, that appears intended not to be legally binding
but more in the nature of a recommendation and thus not a "decision" within the
meaning of Article 25. Some terminology is ambiguous. If the Security Council
"calls upon" or "requests" States to do something, it is not always clear simply from
its wording whether this is a "decision" or not. At least one writer has suggested
that "calls upon" is not a decision but is of the nature of a recommendation. 24
However, this expression was used in the operative parts of Resolutions 665, 787
and 875, where the Security Council called upon States to enforce the sanctions
that it had imposed on Iraq, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Haiti, respectively, and was clearly regarded both by States and by writers as being intended to
be legally binding.
Question 1. Is It Likely or Possible That There Is or Could Be a Conflict between
a UN Security Council Resolution and the 1982 LOS Convention?
It is d ear at the outset that there cannot be a conflict in the true sense-a conflict of
norms-where there is incompatibility between a legally binding act (such as a
treaty provision) and a non-legally binding act. Thus, there is no conflict where
there is incompatibility between any act of the UN Security Council that is not a
"decision" within the meaning of Article 25 of the UN Charter and the 1982 LOS
Convention. Only where the Security Council resolution is a "decision" can there
be, at least potentially, a conflict with the Convention. However, some such potential conflicts are avoided because of provisions either in the resolution or in the
Convention.
In the case of a Security Council resolution, it may authorize or call on UN
members to take action "consistent with international law" (for example, Resolution 1540 (2004),25 paragraphs 3 and 10 (on the prevention oftrafficking in WMD),
and Resolution 1695 (2006),26 paragraph 3 (concerning the transfer of missiles and
related items to North Korea)). Clearly "international law" in this context includes
the 1982 LOS Convention. This means that action taken by UN members under
these resolutions must be consistent with the Convention and so no question of
conflict will arise.
Turning now to the 1982 LOS Convention, several of its provisions stipulate
that navigational rights are subject to other provisions of international law. Thus,
Article 92 provides that while ships on the high seas are in principle under the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State, this is subject to exceptions "expressly provided for in international treaties." Likewise, Article 110, in setting out the limited
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circumstances in which a warship may stop and board a foreign ship on the high
seas, prefaces this with the words "except where acts of interference derive from
powers conferred by treaty." "International treaties" in Article 92 and "treaties" in
Article I tO appear to include the UN Charter, as well as legally binding acts
adopted thereunder, such as a Security Council resolution under Chapter VIP ?
Thus interference by a warsh ip of one State with a ship of another State on the
high seas (or in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ)28) pursuant to a Security
Council decision under Chapter VII of the UN Charter will not be in con flict with
the Convention. 29
In other situations of interference with navigational rights set fo rth in the 1982
LOS Convention, the position may not be so clear. Suppose, for example, that a
warship of State A, purportedly acting pursuant to a Security Council resolution
adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, intercepts a ship registered in State B
that is exercising its right of innocent passage through State C's territorial sea. On
the face of it, the warship's action would violate both the right of innocent passage
of State B's ship and State C's sovereignty over its territorial sea. Under Article 2(3)
of the Convention, a State exercises sovereignty over its territorial sea "subject to
this convention and to other rules of international law." Under Article 19(I) a
ship's right of innocent passage is to "take place in conformity with this convention
and other rules of international law." In each case, the "rules of international law"
presumably include the Charter and legally binding acts adopted thereunder. XI In
the scenario just outlined, the warship of State A, and the Security Council resolu·
tion under which it is acting, would not appear to breach the Convention as far as
the interference with State C's sovereignty over its territorial sea is concerned, since
such sovereignty is "subject to" other rules of internationallaw}l The interference
with State B's ship may be different, however. Article 19(1) does not say that the
right of innocent passage is "subject to" the rules of internationa1law, but that in·
nocent passage is to take place "in conformity with" other rules of international
law. Both its wording and its context suggest that this provision is directed to the
way in which a ship exercises its right of innocent passage, and could not therefore
cover the acts of the warship of State A. Unless one can argue that passage in con·
formity with the rules of international law includes the notion that a ship in inno·
cent passage is required to allow itself to be interfered with by a warship of a State
other than the coastal State when that warship is acting under a binding Security
Council resolution-and this may be a sustainable argument-there would be a
conflict between the Convention and the resolution in the scenario above. There
would seem to be even more likelihood of a conflict in the case of interference by a
foreign warship with a ship exercising a right of transit passage through an interna·
tional strait because the provisions of the Convention dealing with transit passage
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do not contain any reference to such passage having to be in confonnity with international law.
In practice so far there has actually been relatively little potential for conflict between Security Council resolutions and the 1982 LOS Convention, either because
particular resolutions are not legally binding or because the wording of the resolution or the provision of the Convention at issue avoids conflict by making one subject to the other. Depending on how one interprets the reference to the "rules of
international law" in Article 19(1 ) of the 1982 LOS Convention, any actual conflicts between navigational rights in the Convention and Security Council resolutions that may exist have largely been in the context of Security Council Resolution
820, which prohibited all commercial shipping from entering the territorial sea of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Question 2. Are Conflicts between a Security Council Resolution and the 1982
LOS Convention Resolved by Either the UN Charter or the Convention?
Where a conflict between a Security Council resolution and the 1982 LOS Convention does arise, how is it to be resolved? Does either the UN Charter or the Convention provide for its resolution? In the case of the Charter, Article 103 provides that
"in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the UN under
the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement,
their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail." Thus, the Charter prevails over any treaty that is in conflict with it, whether that treaty was concluded before or after the Charter came into force. 32 The phrase "obligations under the
present Charter" in Article 103 includes binding decisions adopted by UN bodies
under the Charter, such as decisions adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII. 33 Thus, the latter will prevail over any conflicting treaty provisions.:l4 The
consequence of Article 103, therefore, is that Security Council resolutions that are
legally binding will prevail over any conflicting provisions of the 1982 LOS
Convention.
Although that appears to resolve the matter, for the sake of completeness one
should also consider what (if anything) the 1982 LOS Convention has to say about
the issue. Article 3 11 of the Convention addresses possible conflicts between the
Convention and a range of other treaties. The latter do not explicitly include the
Charter. Two provisions of Article 3 11 are potentially relevant to the relationship
of the Charter (and Security Council resolutions) to the Convention. First, paragraph 2 provides that the Convention "shall not alter the rights and obligations of
States Parties which arise from other agreements compatible with this Convention
and which do not affect the enjoyment by other States Parties of their rights or the
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perfonnance of their obligations under this Convention." Obviously, the Charter
as such is compatible with the 1982 LOS Convention, but it is also clear that Security Council resolutions adopted under it have the potential to, and on occasions
actually do, affect the enjoyment of States' rights under the Convention. This
might suggest that in such a situation the Convention would prevail over the resolution in question. However, this is negated by Article 103 of the Charter, which
clearly must have priority in this situation since there was no intention on the part
of the drafters of the 1982 LOS Convention to try to override or negate Article 103
of the Charter. 35 In any case, any apparent conflict between Article 311(2) of the
Convention and Article 103 of the Charter will in practice on many occasions be
avoided as a result of paragraph 5 of Article 311, which provides that Article 31 1
(including paragraph 2) "does not affect international agreements expressly permitted or preserved by other articles of this Convention. " It was suggested earlier
that the various references to "treaties" and "international law" found in such provisions of the Convention as Articles 2(3), 19(1),92 and 110 include the Charter
and Security Council resolutions adopted thereunder. It can therefore be argued
that the Charter and SecurityCouncil resolutions are permitted or preserved by the
articles in question and therefore that they are not affected by the 1982 LOS
Convention.

Question 3. Would a Dispute Settlement Body Acting under Part XV of the
1982 LOS Convention Have the Competence to Consider and Rule on
Questions 1 and 2 Above?
Rather than try to answer this question in the abstract, an easier way is to consider
what might happen in a hypothetical dispute. Suppose a warship of State A, purportedly acting pursuant to a Security Council resolution, stops a merchant vessel
registered in State B that is exercising a right of innocent passage through the territorial sea of State C, boards it and searches it for WMD. State B then brings a case
against State A before a 1982 LOS Convention dispute settlement body arguing
that State A has breached its vessel's right of innocent passage under the Convention. State A's defense is that its actions are justified because the reference to "rules
of international law" in Article 19( 1) of the Convention requires State B's vessel to
be subject to searches under the Security Council resolution (compare the discussion on this point above); but if this is not the case, the actions ofits warship pursuant to the resolution trump the right of innocent passage of State B's ship by virtue
of Article 103 of the Charter. Suppose that the 1982 LOS Convention dispute settlement body rejects State A's first argument. Can it consider its alternative defense
or is this beyond its jurisdiction? At first sight, the latter might indeed appear to be
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the case since Article 288( 1) of the Convention limits the jurisdiction of a dispute
settlement body to "any dispute concerning the interpretation and application of
this Convention ." A dispute settlement body under the Convention does not,
therefore, have jurisdiction to hear disputes involving other treaties, such as the
UN Charter and acts done pursuant to it. However, there are a number of arguments to suggest that this is an oversimplified approach to Article 288( 1) and that
the 1982 LOS Convention dispute settlement body could indeed consider State A's
alternative defense.
Even though the question before the dispute settlement body is whether the acts
of State A that have interfered with State B's rights under the 1982 LOS Convention
are overridden by the Security Council resolution, the dispute arguably remains
one related to the "application" of the Convention, namely, the alleged breach of
its provisions on innocent passage. Article 293 of the Convention, dealing with applicable law, provides that a dispute settlement body having jurisdiction under Article 288( 1) "shall apply this Convention and other rules of international law not
incompatible with the Convention." This provision would allow the dispute settlement body to consider the Security Council resolution since the phrase ..other
rules of international law not incompatible with the Convention" must include the
UN Charter and legally binding acts adopted thereunder. Support fo r this position
can be found in the judgment of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
in the M/V Saiga (No. 2) case, where, on the basis of Article 293, the Tribunal invoked the customary international law rules governing the degree of permissible
force that may be used to arrest ships, to find that Guinea's breach of the 1982 LOS
Convention in illegally arresting the Saiga was compounded by its excessive use of
force. 36 The Tribunal also suggested that had the necessary conditions for its application been fulfill ed (which they were not), Guinea might have been able to rely on
the general international law of necessity to justify its breach of the Convention. 37
A second argument to support the competence of a dispute settlement body,
acting pursuant to the 1982 LOS Convention, to consider State A's alternative defense relates to Article 298(1) of the Convention. The latter provides that a State
party may at any time make a declaration excepting from compulsory dispute settlement any dispute to which it is a party concerning military activities, law enforcement activities relating to its rights in the EEZ or disputes in respect to which
the UN Security Council "is exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter of
the United Nations, unless the Security Council decides to remove the matter from
its agenda or calls upon the parties to settle it by the means provided for in this
Convention." Since this is an optional exception to the jurisdiction of a 1982 LOS
Convention dispute settlement body, it presupposes that some disputes involving

150

Robin R. Churchill
action taken by the Security Council may come before a Convention dispute settle·
ment body.l8
A third argument is a policy one. If in the hypothetical dispute outlined above,
the dispute settlement body could not consider State A's argument based on the suo
periority of the Security Council resolution over provisions of the 1982 LOS Con·
vention, this would lead to the fragmentation of the dispute, with this point having
to be dealt with (if at all) under some other dispute settlement mechanism. It is de·
sirable on grounds of judicial econom y not to fragment disputes if this can reason·
ably be avoided. Furthermore, if the argument about the superiority of a Security
Council resolution over a Convention provision were not dealt with by another
body, considerable injustice might be caused, because State A might be found to
have violated the Convention without its perfectly plausible defense based on the
superiority of the resolution being considered at all. Some support for the policy
argument put forward here can be fo und in remarks made by the President of the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Judge Wolfr um, in addresses to the
UN General Assembly and before an Informal Meeting of Legal Advisers in 2006.39
Judge Wolfrum argued, based on the deliberations of the Tribunal judges at their
2006 sessions on administrative and legal matters not connected with cases, that in
a maritime boundary delimitation case the T ribunal had competence not only in
respect to such delimitation but also in respect to associated disputed issues of de·
limitation over land and sovereignty over territory because of their dose connec·
tion with the maritime delimitation. Although Judge Wolfrum did not use the
expression "fragmentation of the dispute" explicitly, this position taken by the Tri·
bunal judges seems to be based on a similar idea since President Wolfrum justified
it in part on the basis of the " principle of effectiveness" which "enables the
adjudicative body in question to truly fulfill its function. "40
A fi nal argument to support the competence of a 1982 LOS Convention dis·
pute settlement body to consider State A's defense based on the super iority ofthe
Security Council resolution is the practice of some other international courts, in
particular the European Court of H uman Rights. That court's jurisdiction is lim·
ited by Article 32 of the European Convention on Human Rights to "all matters
concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention. " Nevertheless,
in a recent case the court held that it was competent to consider whether certain ac·
tions taken under the aegis of the NATO· led Kosovo Force and the UN Mission in
Kosovo amounted to breaches of the Convention.41 Although the Convention con·
tains no provisions on applicable law, the court held that it could not interpret and
apply the Convention "in a vacuum" but "must also take into account relevant
rules of international law when exam ining questions concerning its jurisdiction."
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Such rules indude the UN Charter and Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII. 42
If the meaning of the Security Council resolution at issue in the above hypothetical dispute is dear, the matter is relatively straightforward. But if it is not (for example, if there is doubt as to whether the resolution is a decision within the
meaning of Artide 25 of the Charter or whether its terms authorize the search of
foreign vessels in innocent passage) , would the 1982 LOS Convention dispute settlement body have the competence to interpret the resolution? This is an important question because Security Council resolutions are often quite vague as to what
action may be taken and where. Artide 288(1) might suggest that a Convention
dispute settlement body does not have the competence to interpret SecurityCouncil resolutions. However, there are arguments to the contrary. First, it would be illogical if a 1982 LOS Convention dispute settlement body could apply a Security
Council resolution whose meaning was dear but was preduded from doing so if
the meaning of the resolution was not wholly certain. In any case, the distinction
between applying an apparently dear legal provision and interpreting a legal provision is not always dear-cut. Secondly, there is support for the proposition that the
Convention dispute settlement body would have the competence to interpret the
resolution at issue from analogous practice by the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea. In the Saiga No.2 case the Tribunal had to discover and articulate
the customary international law relating to the use offorce in arresting ships, a not
markedly different exercise from interpreting a written legal text. 43 Furthermore,
other international courts whose jurisdictions do not cover the interpretation and
application of the UN Charter and acts adopted thereunder have considered themselves competent to interpret Security Council resolutions that are relevant to determining the outcome of the case before them, e.g., the European Court of
Human Rights in Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France et al. 44 Thirdly, to say
that a 1982 LOS Convention dispute settlement body may not interpret a Security
Council resolution would again lead to fragmentation of the dispute.
If there are concerns that the interpretation of Security Council resolutions
should be left to the International Court ofJustice, as the principal judicial organ of
the United Nations, these concerns may be allayed by pointing out that the consequences of any interpretation of a Security Council resolution by a 1982 LOS Convention dispute settlement body are limited. Any interpretation would be binding
only on the parties to the case, not on other UN members or on the UN Security
Council itself. 4s
However, it would be going too far to say that a 1982 LOS Convention dispute
settlement body could rule on the legality of a Security Council resolution-this
would dearly exceed its jurisdiction under Artide 288(1). That this is so is
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supported by the practice of other courts. Thus, the European Union's Court of
First Instance has taken the position, based on Articles 25, 48 and 103 of the UN
Charter, as well as European Union law, that it cannot review the lawfulness ofSecurity Council resolutions, altho ugh, curiously perhaps, it has m ade a limited exception in the case of possible incompatibility of Security Council resolutions with
ius cogens.46 The European Court of Human Rights has implied that it lacks the jurisdiction to q uestion the validity of Security Council resolutions as to doso would
interfere with the effective functioning of the Council under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter. 47 Thus, it would seem that if the dispute settlement body found that the
interference by State A's warship with State B's vessel fell within the terms of a legally binding Security Council resolution adopted under Chapter VII, it would
have to accept that the acts of the warship overrode State B's rights under the 1982
LOS Convention. To do otherwise would not only risk interfering with the activities of the Security Council under Chapter VII but also challenge Article 103 of the
UN Charter. It needs to be asked, however, whether this would be the position if
the Convention dispute settlement body were the International Court of Justice.
Whether the Court may review the legality of Security Council resolutions is a
hotly debated topic,48 but one o n which it is no t necessary to take a view here. Even
if the Court does have such competence in general terms, it would not appear to
have it where its jurisdiction in a particular case was derived from the 1982 LOS
Convention, as like every other Convention dispute settlement body, its jurisdiction is confined by Article 288(1) ofthe Convention to disputes "concerning the
interpretatio n and application" of the Convention.
Finally, it may be noted that a 1982 LOS Convention dispute settlement body
would not be able to hear the dispute if either State A or State B had made a declaration under Article 298 excepting from compulsory dispute settlement "disputes
concerning military activities" and/or disputes in respect to which the Security
Council was exercising its functions under the UN Charter, and such a declaration
covered the dispute between States A and B. However , statistically the chances of
this are slight, as only 19 of the 155 parties to the Convention have made such declarations. Furthermore, the exception in Article 298( 1)(c) may be less far- reaching
than it at first sight appears. Excepted under it are "disputes in res pect of which the
Security Council of the United Nations is exercising the functions assigned to it by
the Charter of the United Nations" (emphasis added). In the scenario being discussed here, the exception will not apply unless there is actually a dispute between
States A and B with which the Security Council is dealing. If State A is m erely purportedly acting under a Security Council resolution (as is posited in the scenario
here), the exception will not apply (though of course the military activities exception may).
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Conclusions
The aim of this article was to consider three questions. As far as the first question is
concerned, whether there are in fact or are likely to be conflicts between UN Security Council resolutions and the 1982 LOS Convention (in particular, the latter's
provisions dealing with navigational rights), the answer is that in most cases a confli ct is or would be avoided either because of the language of the Security Council
resolution (ifit states that action to be taken under it should be consistent with international law) or because the situation is one where the Convention provides for
the possibility of interference with shipping pursuant to Security Council resolutions. The latter is particularly the case in respect to interferences with foreign merchant shipping by warshipson the high seas or in the EEZ. The most likely situation
where a conflict would arise would be where there was interference with a ship
while in the territorial sea by a State, other than the flag or coastal State, purportedly acting under a Security Council resolution. Where such a conflict did arise
(turning to the second question), it follows from Article 103 of the UN Charter that
the conflict would be resolved by the UN Security Council resolution taking priority over the Convention. The third question was whether a 1982 LOS Convention
dispute settlement body would have the competence to decide a dispute involving
an alleged conflict between the Convention and a UN Security Council resolution.
It was argued that notwithstanding Article 288( I) of the Convention, which limits
the jurisdiction of a Convention dispute settlement body to disputes "concerning
the interpretation and application" of the Convention, such a body would have the
competence to rule on an alleged conllict between the Convention and a UN Security Council resolution. This follows from the provisions of the Convention on applicable law, from the fact that exceptions to the jurisdiction of Convention dispute
settlement bodies for disputes involving military matters or the Security Council
are optional, and in order to avoid fragmentation of the dispute. For similar reasons, a 1982 LOS Convention dispute settlement body would also be competent to
interpret a Security Council resolution but it could not question its validity. Support for the position put forward here is provided by the practice of other international courts.
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